A agência Standard & Poor's rebaixou nesta segunda-feira (24) a nota de crédito soberano do Brasil em um nível, de 'BBB' para 'BBB-', mas ainda dentro da faixa de grau de investimento. A S&P também mudou a perspectiva do rating de negativa para estável.
A Standard & Poor's justificou sua decisão pelos sinais pouco claros da política econômica do governo da presidente Dilma Rousseff, que enfrenta um frágil quadro fiscal, assim como pela desaceleração do crescimento do país. A agência considera que o país ainda é considerado seguro para investir, mas que altos gastos do governo e baixo crescimento levam a um aumento de risco.
Em comunicado, a S&P disse que o rebaixamento do rating reflete a combinação de "derrapagem orçamentária" em meio as perspectivas de "crescimento moderado nos próximos anos" e de baixo volume de investimentos.
O rebaixamento da nota do Brasil já era esperado por parte do mercado e acontece duas semanas após o ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, ter recebido a visita de uma representação da agência de classificação, que veio ao país colher dados sobre a situação econômica brasileira e contas do governo
A nota do Brasil na classificação feita pela S&P estava em BBB desde novembro de 2011. No ano passado, o país passou a ser indicado pela agência com perspectiva negativa.
A S&P é a primeira das agências de classificação de risco a rebaixar a nota do Brasil para o primeiro degrau do grau de investimento. Pela Moody´s e Fitch, o rating do Brasil permanece no segundo degrau desde 2011.
Quanto maior o rating de um país, melhor ele é sob o ponto de vista de atração de investimentos. A nova nota representa o primeiro degrau na escala considerada "grau de investimento", dada a países avaliados como investimento seguro pelas agências.
No mercado financeiro, o rating de um país funciona como um "certificado de segurança" que as agências de classificação dão a países que elas consideram que são bom pagadores de seus compromissos.
Confira abaixo a íntegra da nota da agência em inglês:
On March 24, 2014, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Brazil to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and
its long-term local currency rating to 'BBB+' from 'A-'. The outlook on our
long-term credit ratings is stable.
We lowered the short-term foreign currency credit rating to 'A-3' from 'A-2',
while the short-term local currency rating is unchanged at 'A-2'. The transfer
and convertibility assessment was lowered to 'BBB+' from 'A-'.
Our 'brAAA' national scale rating on Brazil remains unchanged, and the outlook
on the national scale rating remains stable.
RATIONALE
The downgrade reflects the combination of fiscal slippage, the prospect that
fiscal execution will remain weak amid subdued growth in the coming years, a
constrained ability to adjust policy ahead of the October presidential
elections, and some weakening in Brazil's external accounts. Low growth
prospects reflect both cyclical and structural factors, including investment
as a share of GDP of only 18% in 2013 and a slowdown in growth in the labor
force. Combined, these factors underscore the government's diminished room for
maneuver in the face of external shocks.
The credit ratings on Brazil reflect its well-established political
institutions, broad commitment to policies that maintain economic stability,
and its large and diversified economy. Following deterioration in the current
account deficit and some moderation in foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows, net external debt levels are rising but remain manageable. Brazil's
general government debt burden is high, but its composition remains solid
(denominated overwhelmingly in local currency and mostly at fixed- or
inflation-linked rates). These factors underpin the low-investment-grade
ratings.
Brazil's fiscal deterioration during the past several years includes somewhat
higher deficits as a result of a lower primary (or non-interest) fiscal
surplus and ongoing off-budget activities. Credibility around the conduct of
fiscal policy systematically weakened as the government exempted various
spending and revenue items from the fiscal target, in addition to lowering the
target itself over time. Persistent use of state-owned banks, financed by
"below the line" funding from the Treasury, also undermined policy credibility
and transparency. Fiscal execution, such as that in 2013, has become more
reliant on receiving "non-current" or one-off revenues and adjusting the
timing of spending outlays to meet official fiscal targets.
Policy signs ahead of the October presidential election to stem the fiscal
slippage this year are mixed. In addition, so are prospects for adjustment
after the election, in our view. Despite the recent budgetary reprogramming
effort that cuts some spending from the 2014 budget passed by Congress, it
will be difficult to achieve the formal 1.9% of GDP primary surplus target
without recourse to "one-off adjustments," in our view, given low growth and
the continuation of some tax exemptions. The implementation of the recently
announced measures to manage losses in the electricity sector (given low
rainfall and reliance on high cost thermal energy) with a limited increase in
electricity tariffs in an election year may be challenging. Whereas these
measures are in line with recent history of quasi-fiscal activity, the
government appears to be reducing the pace of lending from state-owned banks,
and with it "below the line" financing for them from the Treasury; if that
remains on track, over time it could be supportive for the rating. However,
other downside fiscal risks stem from the performance of state and local
governments (whose shortfalls are no longer compensated for by the federal
government) and the impending ruling from the Supreme Court regarding savings
accounts (that may result in the federal government having to fund losses in
the banking sector). Combined these factors could put additional pressure on
Brazil's future fiscal performance.
We expect low growth in Brazil to persist over the next several years with
real GDP expanding by 1.8% in 2014 and 2% in 2015. This outlook reflects some
modest improvement in exports this year, and an expected stronger contribution
in 2015, from lagged effects of real depreciation. Following many delays, the
government's important concession program is slowly advancing and should
provide some support for investment. That said, we still expect overall
private-sector investment to remain lackluster given persistent negative
business sentiment and a wait-and-see attitude associated with the election,
the risk of energy rationing, and the lagged effects of the 350-basis-point
rise in the monetary policy rate since April 2013. We expect the pace of
household spending to be constrained by higher consumer indebtedness and more
moderate job creation and real wage gains. The prospect for at least some
additional fiscal and monetary tightening after the elections (assuming some
electricity and energy prices increases) is likely to keep growth little
changed next year, in our view.
We expect general government debt, net of liquid assets (not including
international reserves), to rise somewhat in 2014 and 2015 to around 44% to
45% of GDP. We project that the general government deficit will rise toward
3.9% of GDP, from 3.2% in 2013, on a lower primary surplus result relative to
2013 and the government's target, and higher interest rates, with interest as
a percent of revenues over 13%. We expect some decline in the deficit
beginning 2015, reflecting prospects for a somewhat tighter fiscal policy
following the election. However, there is uncertainty on its size and scope.
The larger change in general government debt to GDP vis-à-vis the deficit
incorporates "below the line" fiscal spending, besides some fluctuations in
central bank repo operations.
We expect Brazil's external vulnerability will rise somewhat over the next
several years. In 2013, FDI did not fully cover Brazil's current account
deficit; we expect this trend to continue, with narrow net external debt set
to rise to over 20% of current account receipts from an average 10% over the
past five years. Our estimates of external debt are calculated on a residency
basis. They include nonresident holdings of locally issued Brazilian
real-denominated government debt estimated at about US$139 billion (47% of
current account receipts) in 2013. They do not include, however, debt raised
offshore by Petrobras and upstreamed in the form of FDI to the head office.
That said, despite the wider current account deficit, more than 3.5% of GDP,
Brazil has comparatively low external financing needs vis-à-vis some peer
issuers owing in large part to its high level of international reserves.
Our higher local currency rating on Brazil reflects the credibility of its
monetary policy, its floating exchange-rate regime, and the depth of its
capital markets.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects our view that Brazil's institutional and policy
framework coupled with its fiscal and external balance sheet strengths afford
it sufficient room for maneuver and the ability to withstand external shocks
consistent with a low-investment-grade rating.
We could raise the ratings following more consistent policy initiatives to
strengthen the fiscal accounts or outline a more proactive reform agenda to
put medium-term growth on stronger trajectory. This would likely generate
greater private-sector confidence and higher investment and afford the
government more fiscal and monetary flexibility.
We could lower the ratings following a sharp deterioration in Brazil's
external and fiscal indicators that is coupled with an unraveling of Brazil's
past commitment to pragmatic policy. Notwithstanding the downgrade, we see
Brazil's broad macroeconomic policy framework as supportive of its
investment-grade ratings.
